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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 170.— October Term, 1923.
J. Harold Lehmann, Plaintiff in  
Error,
vs
In Error to the Supreme 
  Court of the State of
State Board of Public Accountancy 
et al.
Alabama.
[December 10, 1923.]
Mr. Justice M cKen na  delivered the opinion of the Court.
By a statute o f the State, a board denominated the Board of 
Pubic Accountancy was created. The Board has authority to 
examine applicants for certificates or licenses to practice the busi­
ness or calling of public accountant and to issue certificates to 
those whom the Board deems qualified.
The Board is given power to cancel the certificate granted “ for 
any unprofessional conduct of the holder of such certificate, or 
for other sufficient cause”  upon written notice of 20 days and a 
hearing thereon. The defendants in error, Alvidge, Edson and 
Rosson constitute the Board.
Complaint was made against plaintiff in error by the other de­
fendants in error who are public accountants, a day set for hearing 
and notice thereof given to plaintiff in error as required by the 
statute.  
He appeared at the time appointed but subsequently brought 
this suit praying that the Board and its members be enjoined and 
restrained from hearing the charges preferred against him, or from 
making or entering any order revoking or attempting to revoke the 
certificate issued to him, or from interfering in any way with the 
practice of his profession as such certified public accountant. It 
was also prayed that the other defendants in error be enjoined 
from prosecuting the charges that they had preferred.
A  temporary restraining order was issued and an order to show 
cause why it should not be made permanent.
The bill was dismissed on demurrer for want of equity and on 
appeal to the Supreme Court the decree was affirmed. The Chief 
Justice of the Court then granted this writ of error.
The ground of it and the reliance here is, expressed in several 
ways, that the statute of the State is in conflict with the Consti­
tution of the State and also in conflict with the Constitution of 
the United States, the latter in that it, the statute, deprives plain­
tiff in error of his property without due process of law, and sub­
jects him to an ex post facto law.
The bill is very long. Its important facts are as follows: Plain­
tiff in error had “ by experience and assiduous attention to his 
duties built up a large and lucrative business. ’’ Upon the appoint­
ment of the Board he applied for, and was issued a certificate after 
standing the tests and examinations prescribed, and since that time 
he has been practicing his profession as a certified public ac­
countant.
The Board has never adopted any code or promulgated any 
rules or definition of what is or is not professional conduct, or 
what is sufficient cause for the revocation of a certificate.
He appeared before, the Board at the day appointed for 
the hearing of the charges against him and was informed by the 
Board that there were no rules in effect to govern or control the 
hearing, and evidence would be received with some liberality. The 
hearing was continued until January 26, 1922, and plaintiff in 
error notified to be back on that day for the purpose of being 
tried.
It is nowhere averred in the charges against him that any­
thing that he had done was wrongful or unlawful, the only alle­
gation being that the alleged acts complained of were surrepti­
tious.
The acts are enumerated and it is expressly denied that he was 
guilty of anything wrongful, surreptitious or unlawful.
It is further averred that the Board has prejudged his acts, and 
that the determination by the Board as to whether his certificate 
should be revoked rests wholly within the arbitrary, uncontrolled 
and unappealable judgment of the Board.
The unconstitutionality of the Act is averred both under the 
State and Federal Constitutions.
The contention that the statute and the powers it confers upon 
the Board and the manner o f their exercise are in derogation of
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the Constitution of the State is decisively decided against by the 
opinion of the Supreme Court o f the State and, we may say, that 
there is persuasion in the reasoning of the court against the con­
tention that the statute is in conflict with the Constitution of the 
United States. That is, that the statute is in effect an ex post 
facto law or, if enforced against him, will deprive him of his prop­
erty without due process of law.
The opinion of the court sustained the Board, its- powers, and 
the manner of executing them, but refrained from expressing an 
opinion o f the right or remedy of plaintiff in error. It said, “ It 
is not necessary or proper for this court to now decide what remedy, 
if any, would be available to the appellant [plaintiff in error], if 
his certificate or license should be improperly or illegally revoked or 
cancelled.”  In other words, the court declined to anticipate the 
action of the Board; it decided only that if the State had the 
power to confer a certificate on the plaintiff in error through the 
Board, it had the power, through the Board, to take it away or 
to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which it might be for­
feited. And the court further said that the appeal was without 
equity, since neither the trial court nor it could know in advance 
of the hearing that the Board would sustain the charge.
The reasoning is conclusive. The procurement of a certificate 
was deemed of value by plaintiff in error. It was the con­
firmation of his reputation, giving to it the sanction of an official 
investigation and judgment. He knew the condition of its issue, 
knew that the conduct that secured it was a condition of its re­
tention, that for inconstancy of merit it could be forfeited. And 
forfeited if it had been improvidently granted or procured by con­
cealment or deception. And necessarily so, or the certificate would 
be a means of pretense.
Plaintiff in error puts some stress upon the absence of rules by 
the Board urging that the statute is in conflict with the Constitu­
tion of the United States because it purports to authorize the re­
vocation of a certificate “ without defining or determining in ad­
vance what grounds or facts or acts shall be sufficient cause for 
such revocation.”  Such absence permits, it is asserted, arbitrary 
action. We cannot yield to that assertion or assume that the Board 
will be impelled to action by other than a sense of duty or render 
judgment except upon convincing evidence introduced in a regu­
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lar way with opportunity of rebuttal. We certainly cannot restrain 
the Board upon the possibility of contrary action. Official bodies 
would be of no use as instruments of government if they could be 
prevented from action by the supposition of wrongful action.
This Court and other courts have decided that a license or 
certificate may be required of a physician, surgeon, dentist, lawyer 
or school teacher. Douglas v. Noble, 261 U. S. 165, has pertinent 
comment upon the power of the legislature in that regard. The 
Supreme Court in the present case construed the statute as not 
so exacting of public accountants. In other words, it was decided 
that the indicated professions require a license or certificate but 
that a public accountant requires none. And it was decided that 
a public accountant gets no right of business from the grant of a 
certificate; he loses no right of business by its cancellation.
The statute is not, nor are the proceedings before the Board, 
such as plaintiff in error conceives them. The cases he cites are, 
therefore, not pertinent and need no review.*
The motion to affirm must be granted.
So ordered.
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Test:
Clerk, Supreme Court, U. S.
*H ill v. Wallace, 259 U . S. 4 4 ; Booth v. Illinois, 184 U . S. 425, 428 ; All­
geyer v. Louisiana, 165 U . S. 578 ; New York L ife Insurance Co v. Dodge, 
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